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By RUSSELL N. FAIRBANKs*
ENLISTED men and women in the United States Armed Forces sel-
dom just fade away. Many die, retire or are relieved from active duty.
The majority are discharged from the service either administratively1 or
by court-martial.2
Even though courts-martial and the administrative discharge proc-
ess frequently accomplish the same results, many commentators and
almost all judge advocates view the two as distinct procedures. The
great sentencing power of courts-martial make them seem a different
genus than an administrative body which can neither fine, nor sentence,
nor kill, but can only discharge from the service. The judge advocates
are comforted by the governance of courts-martial by an act of Con-
gress. The administrative discharge machinery remains independent.
Finally, the procedural safeguards which surround the accused in a
court-martial are so much greater than those afforded the respondent
in an administrative proceeding that many military lawyers are a bit
uneasy with the latter. Nonetheless, both frequently involve the same
fundamental question: How does a commanding officer rid himself of
unwanted personnel?
Further, the ex-G.I. with the funny discharge (any discharge other
than an honorable discharge) may not fully appreciate the analytical
usefulness of the dichotomy between administrative and court martial
discharges. The results are often the same. One lasts as long as the
other-a lifetime.
Admittedly this approach is oriented from the soldier's viewpoint,
rather than the military's. It deals with the practical consequences of a
discharge rather than the traditional compartmentalization of military
* Dean and Professor of Law, Rutgers University. A.B., 1941, Harvard; LL.B.,
1952, Columbia.
1. 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-.10 (1970) prescribe the policies, standards, and pro-
cedures of the Department of Defense governing the administrative discharge of en-
listed men and women.
2. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, last amended in 1969, and the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, prescribe military justice for all of the
armed forces.
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law as a whole. But this is only reasonable. The ex-G.I. with the
funny discharge cannot be expected to appreciate the analytical useful-
ness of such a difference in procedure when the result is so obviously
the same. One lasts as long as the other, and at least in one significant
aspect (civilian employment) the impact may be as great. In any event
who, if anyone, ever listens to the tortured explanation of an ex-G.I.
trying to explain why he did not measure up to an honorable discharge?
Whether or not the distinction between judicial and administrative
discharges is useful to the judge advocates, the discharge itself has a suf-
ficiently enduring quality both in origin and result to justify linking the
two together. The procedure in each case begins with the command
determination to discharge the soldier and it ends with a discharge.
The procedure in the middle is the subject of this paper. It will appear
that both the judicial and administrative procedures are imperfect solu-
tions to the same problem-although the judicial procedure is perhaps
not as distressing as the administrative one.
I. The Discharge as a Problem
The number of service people affected by judicial or administra-
tive discharges is substantial. In 1965 the military departments sep-
arated 713,337 of their members.3 The overwhelming bulk of those,
671,512, received honorable discharges; but 41,825 did not.4 They
received one of four that carry connotations of less than honorable ser-
vice. While the number of "stigmatized discharges" by administrative
action was more than ten times as great as that by courts-martial,5 the
potential of the latter is not insubstantial. Fiscal year 1969 saw 81,375
general and special courts-martial convened, 6 although few of them,
probably not more than 6,522,7 were actually authorized to award
punitive discharges. But if a greater reliance on court-martial dis-
3. See Joint Hearings on S. 745 through S. 762, S. 2906, and S. 2906, Bills to
Improve the Administration of Justice in the Armed Services, Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and a Special Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1001, 1005, 1035,
1045 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings]. The figure 713,337 does not include
Coast Guard discharges and includes retirements only from the Navy.
4. See id. The figure 671,512 includes retirements only from the Navy.
5. See id. The ratio is actually 38,792 to 3,033.
6. See 1969 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 17, 27, 34, 40 [hereinafter cited as 1969 REPORT].
7. This figure includes the general courts-martial of all the departments, and
the "special court-martial involving BCD" of the Navy. Id.
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charges was desired, all the services need do to empower their special
courts-martial (74,853 in 1969)8 to award bad conduct discharges is:
(1) provide the accused with qualified counsel, (2) keep a verbatim
record of the proceedings, and (3) detail a military judge to the trial.9
A. The Choice of Procedure
In actual practice the decision whether to use courts-martial or ad-
ministrative boards to dispose of unwanted personnel depends on a
number of factors. First, of course, the serviceman's conduct must
offend the punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
make him eligible for a court-martial. Once this hurdle is passed, the
command considers a number of factors including: (a) the soldier's
past conduct; (b) the seriousness of his offense; (c) the effectiveness
of the soldier's representation; and of course (d) how good a case can be
made out against the soldier. Prejudice and compassion are also factors,
familiar to experienced prosecuting agencies, in the evaluation leading
to the decision of how best to treat the offender. One factor that weighs
heavily is the service's analysis of the relative inconvenience of courts-
martial on the one hand and administrative separation on the other.
How burdensome will be the assignment of qualified counsel, the pro-
vision of a military judge, and the taking of a verbatim record in a spe-
cial courts-martial which will try a man who might just as well be ad-
ministratively separated?
B. The Choice of Discharge
Closely related to the question of whether to use a court-martial or
an administrative board is the question of which discharge? The five
possibilities fall into two categories, honorable discharges and all others.
Yet there are significant distinctions among all five.
As would be expected, an honorable discharge is a "separation from
the service with honor."'1 A general discharge is very similar but it is
something less, i.e., a "separation from the service under honorable con-
ditions issued to an individual. . . whose military record is not suffi-
ciently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge."' 1  Both are
given by administrative action,' and both entitle the discharged service-
8. Id.
9. UCMJ art 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (Supp. V, 1970).
10. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(a) (1970).
11. Id. § 730.2(b).
12. Id. § 730.1(c).
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man to the full set of veterans and other benefits available from the fed-
eral government. 3
Unlike an honorable or general discharge, an undesirable discharge,
"an administrative separation from the service under conditions other
than honorable . . . issued for unfitness, misconduct, or security rea-
sons,"14 qualifies its holder for some benefits, disqualifies him for others,
and leaves uncertain his eligibility for many benefits administered by
federal agencies other than the military departments.' 5 One receiving
an undesirable discharge is, for instance, said by the Department of the
Army not to be eligible for payment of accrued leave, transportation of
his dependents from his last domestic station to his home, burial in a
national cemetary, civil service preference or retirement credit, and his
entitlement to those benefits set by the Veterans Administration is said
to be determined by that agency.'6
A bad conduct discharge, like an undesirable discharge, is "a sepa-
ration from the service under conditions other than honorable."" It may
be awarded only by the approved sentence of a general or special court-
martial.'" Very few benefits are within the grasp of the serviceman
holding a bad conduct discharge. If he holds a dishonorable discharge
"by its own connotation . . . a separation from the service under dis-
honorable conditions",' 9 which may be given only by the approved sen-
tence of a court-martial,2 ° he may receive only two of the 36 listed bene-
fits.21
With apparent symmetry then, a discharged serviceman's eligibility
for benefits varies directly with the quality of his discharge, honorable
and general discharges being surface equivalents. But this equivalence
is not total. A general discharge may be given for conduct which many
members of the civilian community, particularly employers, would find
abhorrent in a prospective employee. The Department of Defense regu-
lations authorize its issue to alcoholics,2 2 homosexuals, 23 those pos-
13. See Benefits-Discharges Table, Dep't of the Army GTA 21-2-1, June 1969.
14. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Id.
17. 32 C.F.R. § 730.2(d) (1970).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 730.2(e).
20. Id.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(g) (5) (1970).
23. Id. § 41.6(g)(6).
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sessed of character and behavior disorders, 4 sexual perverts,
25 and to
those convicted by civil authorities of grave offenses.2
6
A general discharge is also appropriate for conduct which, I ex-
pect, would be viewed by a prospective employer as somewhat less
serious. Bed wetting,27 a service record which does not quite measure
up,2 unhandiness, 29 or failure to pay alimony
3" are not as likely to
rouse the same degree of distrust and revulsion as sexual perversion.
But imagine the plight of the veteran attempting to explain to a pro-
spective employer that he got his general discharge for merely shirking
his duties31 rather than some other form of onerous conduct for
which a general discharge might have been issued.
It is true, of course, that an honorable discharge may also be
granted to one who has been found unwanted for any of the reasons
specified above. For example, a homosexual may receive an honorable
or a general discharge "as warranted by the individual's military rec-
ord,"32 and a sodomist who would normally find himself with an unde-
sirable discharge may up-grade his discharge if "the particular circum-
stances in a given case warrant a General or Honorable Discharge.1
33
But the embarassment which faces the holder of a general discharge
seems not to confront the honorably discharged soldier. My own highly
unscientific and too-limited investigation leads me to believe that friends,
relatives, enemies, and prospective employers seldom seek to go behind
an honorable discharge to find out why its holder really left the service.
On the other hand, general discharges, although the surface equivalent
of an honorable discharge, arouse deep suspicions about the quality of
the soldier's military career."
24. Id. § 41.6(g)(2).
25. Id. § 41.6(i)(2).
26. Id. § 41.6(j)(1).
27. Id. § 41.6(g)(4).
28. See id. § 41.6(i)(4). Navy Regulations provide that the issuance of an
honorable discharge is conditioned upon "[piroper military behavior and proficient,
industrious performance of duty having due regard to the rate held and the capabilities
of the individual concerned." Id. § 730.2(a) (2).
29. Id. § 41.6(g)(1).
30. Id. § 41.6(i)(6).
31. Id. § 41.6(i)(1).
32. Id. § 41.6(g).
33. Id. § 41.6(i).
34. This anomaly arises in part because the regulations attempt to equate apples
with pears. Unsuitability, a characterization that may result in a general discharge, is
occasioned by inaptitude, character or behavior disorders, apathy, defective attitudes,
inability to expend effort constructively, enuresis, alcoholism, homosexual or other
aberrant tendencies, or financial irresponsibility. Id. §§ 41.6(g)(l)-(7). This "un-
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H. The Problem with Discipline
Common wisdom has it that how the military treats its allegedly
badly behaved members may, and perhaps should, be more summary
and less protective than the way the civilian community deals with its
aberrant members. In Toth v. Quarles,35 the court said:
We find nothing in the history or constitutional treatment of
military tribunals which entitles them to rank along with Article
III Courts as adjudicators of the guilt or innocence of people
charged with offenses for which they can be deprived of their life,
liberty or property. Unlike Courts, it is the primary business of
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the oc-
casion arise. But trial of soldiers to maintain discipline is merely
incidental to an army's primary fighting function. To the extent
that those responsible for performance of this primary function are
diverted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basic fighting
purpose of armies is not served. And conceding to military per-
sonnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice which
nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be con-
stituted in such a way that they can have the same kind of qualifi-
cations that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair trials of
civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not
provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in military
trial. They are appointed by military commanders and may be re-
moved at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it
does judicial salaries. Strides have been made towards making
courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department
which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from
the very nature of things, courts have more independence in pass-
ing on the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals. 36
And 14 years later in O'Callahan v. Parker37 the Supreme Court
reemphasized the Toth finding and added
A court martial is not yet an independent instrument of jus-
tice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.3 s
With what others might regard as an excess of enthusiasm the Court
continued:
suitability," which seems to be determined by how bothersome the service person is to
his command, is not the same as a discriminating evaluation of the quality of his con-
duct. Since the standards are different, how can the two be equivalent? An admir-
able allowance for special cases, and perhaps for the exercise of compassion, unhap-
pily contribute to the anomaly. That is, one who can be discharged for misconduct,
which usually ends in an undesirable discharge, may receive a general discharge in
extraordinary cases. Id. § 41.6(j).
35. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
36. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
37. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
38. Id. at 265.
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None of the travesties of justice perpetrated under the UCMJ is
really very surprising for military law has always been and contin-
ues to be primarily an instrument of discipline, not justice. Glasser,
Justice and Captain Levy, 12 Columbia Forum 46, 49 (1969).
39
Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., a strong defender of the military,
says that the first reason for the existence of a separate system of mili-
tary justice is "the need for swift and summary machinery for the
maintenance of discipline." 40  His opinion finds support in the Mutiny
Act of 1689, where was urged the necessity that "an exact Discipline be
observed And that Soldiers who shall Mutiny or stirr up Sedition or shall
desert Their Majestyes Service be brought to a more Exemplary and
speedy Punishment than the usuall Forms of Law will allow."
'41  The
traditional notion that nonconforming soldiers cannot safely be accorded
the same judicial safeguards as are their civilian brothers, whether by a
court or by an administrative board, may be right, but it insufficiently
takes into account modem speculation about what makes an army work.
Substantially, the question here is whether a comparatively rough
and ready system of military justice is the underpinning of military disci-
pline, and thus a major contributor to the efficiency of a fighting
force. Only remarkable faith in the utility of coercive power could
answer this affirmatively. Those who have exercised such power, and
some observers of its exercise, have recognized its limitations. Thus
President Truman assumed that some of his successor's orders would
be disobeyed.42
39. Id. at 266. These passages seem more angry than thoughtful. If military
law is primarily an instrument of discipline, and the enthymeme is that discipline is
essential to an effective fighting force, is not the conclusion that the "trial of
soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's primary fighting func-
tion" a bit overdrawn? Given the astonishingly high American army ratio of support
to combat soldiers, is not the Court's assignment of "incidental" to this particular
function a venturesome intrusion into the area of allocation of human resources
within the military? Why cannot military tribunals be constituted to give at least a
workable approximation of the qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essen-
tial to fair trials of civilians in federal courts?
40. Bishop, Military Law, in 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 312 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
41. An Act for punishing Officers or Soldiers who shall Mutiny or Desert Their
Majestyes Service, 1 W. & M., c. 5 (1689).
42. Referring to General Eisenhower in a campaign speech, given Sept. 30, 1952,
President Truman said: "Now I wouldn't count on their candidate for President to
make them behave. You see, he is a military man. He has been in the army ever
since he was eighteen years old. He has been in the habit of saying, 'You do this.'
And it's done. 'You do that.' And it's done. He doesn't understand that the office
of President of the United States is a public relations office, and the President spends
most of his time persuading people to do what they ought to do without being per-
Mr. Roger W. Little, then with the Office of Military Psychology
and Leadership at the United States Military Academy, lived with a
rifle company in Korea from November 1952 through February 1953.
In his professional capacity he observed the technical aspects of combat
operations, and wrote:
The chain of command is, however, a deceptively simple
scheme of the operation of the company. Division of all members
into two status groups, and the distribution of rank corresponding
to position held, tended to reinforce the chain of command. In-
creasing the risk to which all members of the company were ex-
posed weakened the chain of command.
The battlefield situation was the prototype relationship be-tween officers and enlisted men throughout military organization.
Dominating all else was the probability that in a combat event and
as a result of the officer's command, some members of the forma-
tion would be killed or wounded. Second, in the intensive system
of interpersonal relationships existing among those who moved out
in the attack, was a potential for collective defiance of the task de-
manded by the organization. Third, there was the problem of ade-
quate reward for those who conformed and moved forward in the
assualt. Survival, the greatest reward, was a chance of the situation
rather than something to be dispensed by the commander. The
organization could offer nothing more than symbols of compliance
in the form of decorations for valor.
The platoon leader occupied the lowest position of all officers
in the chain of command. As the degree of risk increased, the in-
tensity and frequency of the platoon leader's interaction with en-
listed men increased, and correspondingly, significant interaction
with status peers decreased. The more he participated in their ac-
tivities, the more he tended to share the sentiments of the men he
commanded, and his willingness to use the sanctions available to
him diminished correspondingly.
Yet the situations in which his authority was required were
more crucial than those encountered by commanders at higher
echelons. First, the chances were greater that the men he com-
manded would deviate from his orders because the risks of compli-
ance were greater. Second, he was intimately associated with the
men he commanded. Third, the sanctions at his disposal were of
no immediate value if defiance occurred in the assault. The rifle-
man who refused to advance could only be punished by repeated
threats of sanctions to be imposed when the battle was over.
Besides these problems in using authority, the commander had
to make punishment appear more unpleasant than the risks of com-
bat. For a rifleman, tried by a Summary or Special Court Mar-
tial, only a fine would have been a penalty. If there was a sen-
tence of confinement, the offender would be transferred to a rear
echelon stockade to serve out his sentence, and this would be a re-
suaded." [1952-19531 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: HARRY S. TRUMAN 639
(1966).
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ward rather than a penalty. The result was to make sanctions and
courts martial more effective in prospect than in deed.
Authority was thus likely to fail if used alone. It worked only
because it was supported by "manipulations:" indirect or symbolic
acts which induced implicitly the desired behavior. Such acts had
the objective of creating a condition of generalized individual com-
pliance with the ideals of the organization. They may have taken
the form of an elaborate ritual such as a parade. They may have
been as subtle as occasional breaches in the rigid limits of the so-
cial order by visits to the sick, or informal welfare inquiries while
on formal inspection tours. They might have been as pointed as
the presentation of an award for an exceptionally aggressive ac-
tion, or for a wound incurred in the organization's battle.
43
The increasing complexity of the machines of war, and the pres-
ence within the military of the larger number of enlisted, civilian, and
officer technicians needed to make the machines run require a careful
(and cautious) reexamination of command relations at least insofar as
they rest on coercion. Professor Kurt Lang concludes:
• . . That technocratically oriented military leaders would empha-
size new personnel systems, new management techniques, and new
organizational formats is to be expected in a period of rapid tech-
nological change. The sheer management of the armed forces is
unthinkable without constant innovation in these sectors. Yet
these same practices and programs also have disruptive impacts.
The military professional confronted with an unpredictable
and uncontrollable external environment has traditionally responded
with a drive for internal order and internal consistency. The range
of strategic alternatives narrows as the number and destructive
power of weapons systems increase; conventional definitions of vic-
tory and defeat become ambiguous. The technology of weapons
systems requires the most rationally constructed control devices; yet
there is a point at which military management can become over-
concerned with an ideological effort to impose order and its man-
agerial practices cease to be devices for solving specific organiza-
tional problems. This creates a new danger: old-fashioned mili-
tary rituals can be supplanted by a modernized cult of scientific
management.44
World War II soldiers were not sure of the causes of behavior and
misbehavior. Only 23 percent of the officers and 20 percent of the
enlisted men felt that the best way to get most soldiers to behave was to
punish them every time they did not behave.43 Unfortunately, but for the
43. Little, Buddy Relations and Combat Performance, in THE NEW MxrrARY:
CHANGING PATrrERNS OF ORGANIZATION 195, 208-09 (M. Janowitz ed. 1964) (footnotes
omitted).
44. Lang, Technology and Career Management in the Military Establishment, in
THE NEW MIrrLARY: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ORGANIZAAON 39, 78 (M. Janowitz ed.
1964).
45. Suchman, Stauffer & DeVinney, Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Con-
trol, in 1 STuDIES IN SocIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR II 362, 417 (1949). The
sake of complete clarity, 46 percent of the officers and 67 percent of the
enlisted men thought that fear of punishment was the main reason that
most soldiers obey.46
Research among World War II soldiers led one observer to decide:
The sheer coercive power of Army authority was a factor in
combat motivation which must not be forgotten simply because it
is easy to take for granted. It was omnipresent, and its existence
had been impressed on the soldier from his first days in the Army
when he was read the many punitive articles from the Articles of
War, each ending with the ominous phrase, "punishable in time of
war by death or such other penalty as a court-martial may direct."
The Articles of War themselves specify that the punitive articles are
to be read to all enlisted men at least every six months. This is only
one of the minor ways already examined in earlier chapters in
which every enlisted man long before he reached the scene of com-
bat became fully aware of the coercive sanctions which stood back
of official commands.
Nevertheless, one not familiar with military justice as exer-
cised in combat commands is likely to take an oversimplified
view of the role of naked coercion. Those combat offenses for
which the extreme penalty was authorized-desertion, AWOL from
the lines (legally equivalent to desertion), and misbehavior in the
face of the enemy-were, of course, the ones which involved escape
from the combat situation. But practically never was the death
penalty actually enforced for purely military offenses. To quote
a statement by former Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patter-
son, after the end of the European fighting: "During the entire
length of this war, the Army has executed 102 of its soldiers. All
executions but one were for murder or rape. One was for deser-
tion, the first execution for a purely military crime since the Civil
War. This man, serving in the European Theater, deserted twice
under fire." Generally speaking, then, the death penalty was not
used.
Severity of punishment varied greatly from one division to
another and in respect to similar offenses within the same divi-
sion. Sometimes charges were dropped entirely if the soldier would
return to combat. In other cases offenders were given six-month
terms of hard labor, frequently on roads within range of artillery
fire but under no greater danger than many forward service outfits.
In still other cases, heavy terms of imprisonment were sentenced,
with the offender removed to a stockade or disciplinary training
center. Dishonorable discharge was sometimes made mandatory
at the end of the term. But the death penalty was not normally
considered for a purely military offense. In regard to the heavy
prison terms, many men may have thought it likely that the more
drastic sentences would be revised in response to public pressure at
the end of the war.
data for this work was obtained from the Research Branch, Information and Education
Division, United States Army.
46. Id.
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So the combat man did not in fact face a choice of possible
death from the enemy versus certain death if he refused combat.
The role of the coercive system must have been of a more complex
sort. Aside from the physical unpleasantness of life in a stockade,
which was subject to wide variation, the ways in which the coer-
cive formal sanctions could be effective appear to have involved
informal factors in addition:
1. Some men expressed in interview the fear of losing pay,
family allotments, etc., if they should be convicted by court-martial.
Thus family affectional ties became involved.
2. Both family ties and the reactions of a man's buddies were
involved in the feeling that being convicted and confined was a
disgrace.
3. A man's own established reaction to punishment imposed
by established authority might be called up in varying degrees as a
sense of shame or guilt.
47
The importance of the reactions of a man's buddies in inducing
conforming behavior, as opposed to coercive discipline, was reaffirmed
in Korea. Little found that:
Buddy relationships were the basic element of infantry social
organization in the Korean Conflict. As the first major American
experience in limited warfare, it has predictive value for future
situations in which infantry is employed, for this type of military
engagement has unique characteristics which fall most heavily on
infantry units. "Limited" warfare implies that the survival of the
society is not immediately threatened, and accordingly only a
fraction of the available resources, including men, must be com-
mitted. Yet ideals must be formulated for which some few men
will be willing to make a total sacrifice. With the manpower pool
supporting the conflict far exceeding the demand for replacements,
there are relatively fewer who must bear the battle, and corre-
spondingly less motivational support from the larger society.
48
If there is some doubt of the primacy of punishment in the hier-
archy of inducements to good behavior, is it clear that whatever punish-
ment is necessary, whether administrative or judicial, must be proce-
duraly and substantively more certain than in the civilian community?
Professor Bishop believes so. He says that the members of a court-
martial "cannot forget that the prime purpose of military justice must be
deterrence, which means the swift and certain suppression of miscon-
duct. The principle that it is better that 99 guilty men go free than that
one innocent man be convicted is hard to square with Army discipline.
If a soldier who runs away is shot, in Voltaire's expressive phrase, 'pour
encourager les autres,' the heartening effect is much diminished if 99
47. Smith, Combat Motivations Among Ground Troops, in 2 STuDiEs N SocUL
PSYcHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR II, 105, 112-13 (1949).
48. Little, supra note 43, at 221.
per cent of the deserters go unpunished."49
Not all qualified commentators agree. The Ad Hoc Committee
to Study the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a group of nine general
officers, among whom was the present Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,
William C. Westmoreland, announced that:
Once a case is before a court-martial, it should be realized
by all concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish justice un-
der the law. This does not mean justice as determined by the com-
mander referring a case or by anyone not duly constituted to fulfill
a judicial role. It is not proper to say that a military court-martial
has a dual function as an instrument of discipline and as an instru-
ment of justice. It is an instrument of justice and in fulfilling this
function it will promote discipline. 50
i. The Judicial Process: The Uniform Code
of Military Justice
At the same time that the Supreme Court appears to have said that
it no longer believes in the probable effectiveness of its only slightly
veiled suggestions for the improvement of the Uniform Code, 51 some
commentators display remarkable contentment with the kind of justice
dispensed the military accused. Professor Bishop "[w]ould not favor
radical changes in the system of military justice."52  He finds, "That
modem military justice is, despite its blemishes, about as fair as the
brand of criminal justice dispensed in most of the states. ... 51
The hope here is that both the Supreme Court and Professor Bishop
are wrong, that changes, albeit not what I would term "radical changes,"
will be proved wise, and will be adopted. The Uniform Code of
Military Justice and its most recent amendment, the Military Justice
Act of 1968, 51 both welcome innovations, suggest that Congress will
again amend the statute governing military justice, and will amend it
well. Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military Appeals thinks, "It's
foolish to say either that we cannot improve the Code or that it is totally
49. Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 38, col. 2.
50. Report to Honorable Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, by the
Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Good Order and Discipline in
the Army, in 1960 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY AP-
PEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL
COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1, 12.
51. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955). See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
52. Bishop, supra note 49, at 40, col. 3.
53. Id. at 40, col. 3.
54. Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-
940 (Supp. V., 1970) ). For an approving analysis, see Ervin, The Military Justice
Act of 1968, 5 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 223 (1969).
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deficient. The truth lies somewhere between ... "55
A. Independence of the Military Judge
In the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress elected to furnish a
measure of independence to the military judge, the officer who presides,
much like a civilian judge, over general courts-martial and, at least in
those instances where a discharge is possible, over special courts-mar-
tial.5 The military judge of a general court-martial is designated by
his Judge Advocate General.57 Except in most unusual circumstances,
the officer who has convened the general court-martial may not "prepare
or review any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency
of the military judge so detailed, which relates to his performance of duty
as a military judge." '58 That judge is responsible to his Judge Advocate
General, who is required to approve his assignment to duties other than
those of a general court-martial judge. 9 But the statute does not pro-
vide similar barriers between the military judge of a special court-martial
and the displeasure of his non-lawyer superiors. It should.
No doubt the more circumscribed sentencing power of special
courts-martial, the burden on the Pentagon which would arise from its
closer involvement in the administration of special courts-martial which
are much more numerous than are general courts-martial, and perhaps
the political realities of one reform at a time all combined to deny the
special court-martial judge the limited security assured the general
court-martial judge by the 1968 amendment.
Nonetheless Congress concluded that a bad conduct discharge was
a serious matter. So serious that before a special court-martial could be
authorized to award a bad conduct discharge to an accused, it is required
to have a military judge-assigned.60 A fortiori, that judge needs no less
protection from the same superiors than when he sits on a general
court-martial.
Congress has not granted tenure, even of limited duration, to the
military judge. His assignment to and away from the military judiciary
55. 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 299.
56. UCMJ arts. 16(1)(A)-(2)(B), 10 U.S.C. §§ 816(1)(A)-(2)(B)(Supp. V,
1970).
57. UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
58. Id. The protection would be measurably more effective had the qualifying
phrase "relates to his performance of duty as a military judge" been omitted. This
possibility, that the convening authority who finds the ruling of a military judge dis-
tasteful will also find that judge generally wanting in good military judgment, should
have been anticipated and avoided.
59. Id.
60. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (Supp. V, 1970).
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is dictated by his Judge Advocate General. Tenure, albeit of uneven
extent, is thought to be an essential ingredient of the independence of
the state and federal judiciaries, as well as of the Court of Military Ap-
peals.61 Security of office is equally necessary to buttress the desirable
independence of the military judge.
In an analogous situation permanent professors at the United
States Military Academy are appointed by the President by and with the
consent of the Senate;62 they need not retire until age 64;63 and their
grade (and thus pay) is fixed." I suggest that tenure of similar extent
be provided by statute for military judges. Such legislation would not
completely satisfy the Supreme Court's disquiet about lack of tenure and
salary stability, but it would be a step forward in the restoration of that
court's confidence in the military justice system. 65
B. Independence of Defense Counsel
Just as members of the Court of Military Appeals and military
judges require for their effective functioning barriers against community
displeasure, so do defense counsel. Judge Ferguson has stated, "If the
defense counsel, in the best traditions of our bar, ignores the efforts to
influence him and stands up and fights for his client, he gets a bad effi-
ciency report which can absolutely ruin his military career. . . . If, on
the other hand, counsel is in fact fearful for his career, we will hear
nothing about it, for the record will be totally silent in the matter. The
dice, therefore, are loaded in favor of the sycophant, and something
should and must be done by Congress."66  The American Bar Associa-
tion warns that, "[A] person or organization that pays or furnishes
lawyers to represent others possesses a potential power to exert strong
pressures against the independent judgment of those lawyers."6
Grigory Z. Anashkin, as President of the Criminal Section of the
Soviet Supreme Court, has no small segment of sad history to draw
from. In words reminiscent of complaints that led to reforms in United
61. Judges of the Court of Military Appeals are appointed to terms of 15 years.
UCMJ art. 67(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 4333(b) (1964).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 3886 (Supp. V, 1970).
64. 10 U.S.C. § 4336(a) (1964).
65. See text accompanying note 35 supra. Judicial tenure for life has gathered
some thoughtful critics. See Hearings on S. 1506 to S. 1516 before the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
66. 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 302.
67. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, CANON 5, ETCAL CONSIDER-
ATIONS para. E.C. 5-23 (1969).
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States military justice, he recently stated "that without a defense there
cannot be a proper, impartial and objective trial."
68  He added, "It is
enough to remember the events of the past. The most flagrant viola-
tions of socialist legality were permitted in cases that were heard without
the participation of a defense lawyer."6 9
Lest it be believed that cases of suppression of proper zeal of de-
fense counsel are only of historical interest, Professor Sherman writes:
This summer, however, a former career Army officer, Luther C.
West, completed a dissertation for the Doctor of Juridical Science
degree at George Washington University Law School entitled "The
Command Domination of the Military Judicial Process." This
dissertation, as yet unpublished, contains a detailed and docu-
mented description of improper command influence in a number
of cases of which Mr. West, as an Army officer in the Judge
Advocate General's office, had personal knowledge. The ac-
counts make up a startling picture of command intrique, staff judge
advocate compliance, and lower level accession to command
wishes. The cases range from intense reprisals against a young
military defense counsel, who raised the defense of command in-
fluence, to documented proof of false or misleading testimony by
three field grade officers in an Article 32 investigation to cover up
the role a commanding general had played in incidents leading up
to court-martial charges.70
The response of Congress to Judge Ferguson's plea to strengthen
the independence of defense counsel was sparing. The Military Justice
Act of 1968 provides only that "[N]o person . . . may . . . give a less
favorable rating or evaluation of any member of the armed forces be-
cause of the zeal with which such member, or counsel, represented any
accused before a court-martial. 71
This is not enough. No protection is provided against the com-
mander who finds that the "poor" tactics of defense counsel also evi-
dence that man's generally poor performance of military duty. The stat-
ute offers no remedy for the covert harassment visited upon the non-
conforming. Counsel thought to be overly zealous may discover him-
self transferred to another post at an inconvenient time; official and per-
sonal transactions of his which need the attention of his headquarters
are accomplished even more slowly than usual; his duty is altered to his
dissatisfaction; and he finds himself no longer among the "in" group.
Indeed, because the statutory insulation about the military judge is
perceptibly deeper than that about defense counsel, some commanders
68. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1970, at 3, col. 5 (late city ed.).
69. Id.
70. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MANE L. REv. 59, 90
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Sherman].
71. UCMJ art. 37(b), 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
may be encouraged to assume that the difference is an area where de-
fense counsel is fair game. In any event the extent to which Congress
has defined the military judge of a general court-martial as different, and
has implied that his military unorthodoxy is to be tolerated, is not equally
applicable to defense counsel. It should be.
In each of the military departments there should be an Assistant
Judge Advocate General for the Defense of the same rank as the Judge
Advocate General. Defense counsel should be designated by the As-
sistant Judge Advocate General for Defense for detail by the conven-
ing authority, and neither the convening authority nor any member of his
staff should prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness,
fitness, or efficiency of the counsel so detailed, which relates to his per-
formance of duty as counsel. Defense counsel should be directly re-
sponsible to the Assistant Judge Advocate General for Defense and
should perform duties other than those relating to his primary duty as
defense counsel only when such duties are assigned to him by, or with
the approval of, the Assistant Judge Advocate General for the De-
fense.
72
C. Increased Enlisted Participation
Of proposals to increase the participation of enlisted people in
courts-martial, Professor Bishop has said, "In the cold light of military
reality, it seems doubtful that the discipline and efficiency of an armed
force would be promoted by requiring that a private who slugs the first
sergeant be convicted by the unanimous vote of twelve other privates. ' 73
In 1946 the Doolittle Board remarked that:
A report to the Secretary of War during World War I, submitted
by one of his assistants after a survey of conditions in the Army in
1919, called attention to the "bitterness engendered among the en-
listed men by special privileges accorded the officer personnel
(privileges that have no military significance nor value) who are
in many instances mental and moral inferiors of half of their
subordinates. '74
72. For a parallel suggestion, which administratively is somewhat more elaborate,
see Sherman, supra note 70, at 100.
73. Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 40 col. 3. An enlisted member may now request that one-third of the
court trying him be enlisted persons. UCMJ art. 25(C)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 825(C)(1)
(1964). They turn out to be senior noncommissioned officers, who, barracks rumor has
it, are not inclined to be lenient. See United States v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31,
37, 35 C.M.R. 3, 9 (1964).
74. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR'S BOARD ON OFFICER-ENLISTED MAN
RELATIONSHIPS, S. Doc. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
DOOLITTLE BOARD].
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Whether or not the officer "class" is inferior to so many mem-
bers of its subordinate "class," enlisted personnel seem better qualified
by mental and medical criteria to sit on juries than is the commonality
of the population. The Selective Service System rejected 39.8 percent
of the 5,136,000 draftees it examined in the period 1950 to 1968.
More than 15 percent failed only the mental test. In 1967, 40.7 per-
cent were disqualified; 9.3 percent for mental reasons alone.
75
The prescient Doolittle Board, made up of two lieutenant generals,
an enlisted man who ended the war as a lieutenant colonel, a sergeant
paratrooper, a technical sergeant who won the Medal of Honor, and a
bomber sergeant, noted that:
Social distinctions, both on and off duty, directed attention to the
unnecessary indignities suffered by soldiers-indignities which had
no positive effect upon discipline and military efficiency. . . . The
largest differential, which brought the most criticism in every in-
stance, was in the field of military justice and courts-martial pro-
cedure which permitted inequities and injustices to enlisted person-
nel.76
The board urged the "need for a new philosophy in the military or-
der, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the 'ranks,' in terms
of advanced concepts in social thinking,"77 complained that "[tihe
present system does not permit full recognition of the dignities of
man,"7 18 and recommended "that enlisted personnel be permitted on
courts, but that every member of a court be senior to the accused.
79
I join the Doolittle Board, Professor Sherman, and others in rec-
ommending that an effective, rather than an illusory, provision for en-
listed men on courts-martial be enacted by Congress. Professor Sher-
man wants an enlisted man or an officer to be authorized to elect to have
one-half of his court-martial composed of members of his own rank. 0
This may be a bit much for Congress (and the military!) to swallow all
at once.
I recommend that article 25 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice 8' be amended to provide that commissioned officers, warrant of-
ficers, and enlisted members of the Armed Forces be eligible to serve on
general and special courts-martial, that the array available to the con-
vening authority for his selection be the membership of his command
75. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No.
385, at 261 (1969).
76. DooLrrrLE BOARD, supra note 74, at 11-12.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 21.
80. Sherman, supra note 70, at 98.
81. 10 U.S.C. § 825 (1964).
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subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, that the members of
the court be drawn at random, that no member of the court be junior to
the accused, and that the membership of enlisted persons on the court
be limited to one-third of the total.
The suggestions made here, limited tenure for military judges, the
appointment in each of the military services of an Assistant Judge Ad-
vocate General for the Defense, modest reinforcement of the indepen-
dence of defense counsel, and increased participation of enlisted men in
special and general courts-martial, serve a number of purposes. So do
the reforms urged by Professor Sherman in his study. 2 So do the
changes now under study in the office of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army which would, if adopted, place sentencing power in
the hands of the military judge in noncapital cases, and provide for re-
view by the Supreme Court of decisions of the Court of Military Ap-
peals.8
3
One such purpose is readily evident. As the military judicial sys-
82. Sherman, supra note 70. Professor Sherman's study puts into a context
permitting evaluation Professor Dershowitz's statement that "I don't think any court-
martial can be fair with the kind of control the military has over its men," and Pro-
fessor Bishop's conclusion that "most [courts-martial] are as fair as most civilian
criminal trials (for what that is worth) and their members as fair as civilian jurors
(for what that is worth.)" Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33, col. 1; 34, col. 3. Sherman makes the follow-
ing recommendations: (a) the punitive articles proscribing conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman and all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline (UCMJ arts. 133-34, 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1964) ) be abolished, with
articles of greater specificity being substituted therefor, or, alternatively, that prosecu-
tion under the existing articles be severely limited; (b) the article dealing with con-
temptuous words against the President and other officials (UCMJ Art. 88, 10 U.S.C.
§ 888 (1964) ), and the statute making punishable provoking speeches or gestures
(UCMJ art. 117, 10 U.S.C. § 917 (1964) ), be repealed; (c) jeopardy attach in a
court-martial preventing a second trial for the same offense in any United States civilian
court, and, correspondingly, that double jeopardy should prevent trial by a military
court when the serviceman has already been prosecuted in a civilian court; (d) maxi-
mum sentences should be reduced, and a more discriminatory scale of punishments,
reflective of the degree of culpability involved, be established; and (e) the abolishment
of the President's power to alter or suspend the table of punishments. Sherman,
supra note 70, at 85. Further, Professor Sherman poses far reaching recommendations
which seek to eliminate or reduce the commander's influence over courts-martial. Id.
at 86-87, 96. And finally, he encourages overhauling the structure of post-trial pro-
ceedings. Id. at 102-03.
83. 1969 REPORT, supra note 6, at 20-21. Reservations still remain about the
wisdom of other recommendations under consideration by the office of the Judge
Advocate General of the Army, viz., broadening the contempt powers of the military
judge, permitting the convening authority to order a confinement sentence into exe-
cution, and the prosecution of certain absence without leave and desertion offenses
by the federal courts.
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tern is improved, the potential for abuse is lessened, particularly where
the consequences are as serious as a discharge other than an honorable
discharge. The changes proposed would afford needed protection for
those involved in the process of military justice. But further, without
serious inconvenience to the military, they would quiet the fears of the
Supreme Court, fears which cause the Court continually to seek to cir-
cumscribe the jurisdiction of courts-martial.
84
IV. The Administrative Process: Due or Otherwise
First of all it should be recognized that any separation of a soldier
from the military prior to the normal expiration of his tour of duty is
wasteful, however necessary it may be in some cases. The, military de-
partment loses whatever resources it has put into his training, mainte-
nance, and rehabilitation, and it must find another to put in his place.
The process of eliminating the man, however abbreviated and rudimen-
tary, is still cumbersome, expensive, and non-productive. Although
some enlisted men and women may prefer an early discharge, even one
with an unfortunate characterization attached to it, rather than a con-
tinuation of their military experience, not many so discharged can be
expected to emerge from the process better able to cope with the strains
of civilian life. The community, having paid for the whole affair, finds
in its midst a prematurely discharged soldier with a new collection of
bruises to his spirit. Nobody wins this battle.
What makes a man do well or poorly in the service is a congeries
of highly complicated and perhaps sometimes unknowable factors.
Among the major determinants of performance, Professor Eli Ginz-
berg, 5 then director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project
which was established by General Eisenhower at Columbia in 1950,
found the following:
a. Compulsion. The absence in the military of that degree of
freedom of choice characteristic of the civilian community;
b. Training Reversal. Men taught to curb their aggressiveness
are taught to kill;
c. Strangeness. Men are removed from their families, jobs, and
friends, and sent off to exotic and frequently uncomfortable places;
d. Convictions. How righteous a man believes his country's cause;
84. Id. at 21.
85. 2 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE INEFFECTIVE SOLDIER 1-40 (1959). This
work is the result of a study, The Conservation of Human Resources Project, di-
rected by Eli Ginzberg.
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e. Personality. His physical condition, intelligence, and motiva-
tion;
f. Family. How disruptive was the soldier's removal from his
family, or the break up of that family;
g. Group. How cohesive and how well led was the group which
supplanted the soldier's family;
h. Military Organization. How much did the military invest in
the selection and training of the soldier, how well was the whole business
planned, how disciplined or undisciplined was the soldier's unit;
i. Duty Assignment. A job above or well below a soldier's physi-
cal, intellectual, or emotional capacity eventually will cause him to per-
form poorly;
j. Conflict of Cultural Values. How well did the service reconcile
the often competing needs of efficiency and fairness. How well (or
badly) received was the deeply religious or aberrant soldier; and,
k. Situational Stress.
8 6
In justifying the discharge process, the military departments em-
phasize that part of the selection process which causes the rejection of
those who do not qualify for service. The criteria used include mental,
educational, medical, and moral minimum requirements.87 No doubt
such regulations screen some men and women who, if they were per-
mitted to enter the service, would prove to be administrative discharge
respondents. But, as Professor Ginzberg notes, "As the number of men
who must be screened to meet an organization's needs increases, less
should be expected of the selection mechanism. Pressures of time and
an inexperienced examining group, the impossibility of expanding rap-
idly if large numbers are rejected and the inherent limitations of selec-
tion devices to differentiate validly as to the performance potential of
men with differing backgrounds underwrite this conclusion."881 Ginz-
berg asks that additional resources be devoted to the development of
leaders, that more attention be paid to placing men in jobs they can do,
that factors which tend to weaken motivation not be perpetuated, that
personnel policies be attuned to equity, and that personnel use planning
be more anticipative.8 9
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Army Reg. 601-210 (May 1, 1968).
88. 3 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE INEFFECTIVE SOLDIER 157 (1959).
89. Id. at 158-59. The Army still has trouble arranging its square pegs and
round holes. A recent Department of Defense study shows that 5,722 college
graduates entered the Army in 1969 with academic qualifications which would have
permitted them to enter military specialties with little or no additional training. Only
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The unsuitable or unfit soldier whose conduct does not warrant
trial by court-martial but nonetheless identifies him as being of limited
usefulness to the service needs to be looked at in a new light. If his poor
performance is seen in part as the result of faulty screening, malassign-
ment, imperceptive leadership, inadequate personnel planning, inherent
weaknesses (and strengths?) over which he has no control, and some-
what less than now seems to be the case as volitional recalcitrance, a
better balance can be struck between the miseries of the service and the
man. If he is so viewed, perhaps our unseemly rage to brand as less
than honorable can be reduced.
A. Unsuitability
As discussed before9" a service person may be discharged with
either an honorable or general discharge as warranted by his military
record for unsuitability because of inaptitude, character and behavior
disorders, apathy, defective attitudes, inability to expend effort construc-
tively, enuresis, alcoholism, homosexual or other aberrant tendencies, or
financial irresponsibility. 91 The Department of Defense does not fur-
ther define enuresis, alcoholism, homosexual or other aberrant tenden-
cies, or financial irresponsibility, nor does the Navy. The Army admits
that bedwetting may be caused by other organic or psychiatric condi-
tions and that standing alone it seldom necessitates separation. None-
theless the Army insists that the cause is most often the product of a
character and behavior disorder.92 In sharp contrast to its apparently
unrelenting disapproval of, say "inability to learn,""3 the Army contin-
ues to display a curious tolerance of public drunkenness. It says that
chronic alcoholism "should not be confused with occasional drunken
episodes during which an individual commits antisocial acts."' 94  Fi-
nancial irresponsibility in the Army seems not to be a ground for a find-
ing of unsuitability, but, worse, what may be the same thing shows up
as a category of unfitness.95 Only those in the Army who display
homosexual tendencies, desires, or interest, but who are not overt about
4 percent were assigned to those specialties. At the same time other men without
previous qualifications were trained to fill the same specialties. N.Y. Times, June 19,
1970, at 9, col. 1.
90. See text accompanying notes 22-34 supra.
91. Defense Dep't, 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.6(g)(1)-(7) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212,
para. 6(b)(1)-(6) (July 15, 1966); Navy, 32 C.F.R. §§ 730.10(b)(1)-(7) (1970);
Air Force Manual 39-12, para. 2-4(a)-(f), Sept. 1, 1966).
92. Army Reg. 635-212, para. 6(b) (5) (July 15, 1966).
93. Id. pam. 6(b)(1).
94. Id. para. 6(b)(4).
95. Id. para. 6(a)(6).
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it, may be eligible for "unsuitability,"96 but those who do something
about it may be found unfit or be court-martialed. 97
"Inaptitude" is described by the Department of Defense and the
departments as "[aipplicable to those persons who are best described as
inapt due to lack of general adaptability, want of readiness of skill, un-
handiness, or inability to learn."98
All the departments agree that character and behavior disorders
and disorders of intelligence, as determined by medical authority, fall
within the category of unsuitability. They except combat exhaustion
and other acute situational maladjustments, unless they are manifesta-
tions of more basic underlying disorders.99
Apathy, defective attitudes, and inability to expend effort con-
structively are "significant observable defect[s], apparently beyond the
control of the individual, elsewhere not readily describable," according
to the Department of Defense.100 The Navy and the Air Force con-
cur.' ' The Army finds it necessary to underline that: "The presence
of a physical or mental disease or defect-producing impairment or func-
tion [insufficient to warrant separation under other regulations] is no
bar to discharge for unsuitability."102
B. Unfitness
Here on the borderline between judicial and administrative dis-
charges the Department of Defense lists frequent involvement of a dis-
creditable nature with civil or military authorities as constituting "un-
fitness." Other possibilities include sexual perversion including but
not limited to lewd and lascivious acts, homosexual acts, sodomy, inde-
cent exposure, indecent acts with or assault upon a child, or other inde-
cent acts or offenses, drug abuse, an established pattern for shirking, an
established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay just debts, an
established pattern showing dishonorable failure to contribute adequate
96. Id. para. 6(b)(6). The Air Force regulation is to the same effect. Air
Force Manual 39-12, para. 2-4(f) (Sept. 1, 1966).
97. Army Reg. 635-89, paras. 15-16 (July 15, 1966).
98. 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(g)(1) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212, para. 6(b)(1) (July
15, 1966); Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(b)(1) (1970); Air Force Manual 39-12, para.
2-4(a) (Sept. 1, 1966).
99. Defense Dep't, 32 C.F.R. § 41.6(g)(2) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212, para.
6(b)(2) (July 15, 1966); Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(b)(5) (1970); Air Force Manual
39-12, para. 2-4(b) (Sept. 1, 1966).
100. 32C.F.R. § 41.6(g)(3) (1970) (emphasis added).
101. Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(b)(2) (1970); Air Force Manual 39-12, para.
2-4(c) (Sept. 1, 1966).
102. Army Reg. 635-212, para. 6(b)(3) (July 15, 1966).
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support to dependents or failure to comply with orders, decrees, or judg-
ments of a civil court concerning support of dependents, and unsanitary
habits.1
0 3
C. Lack of Fault
The Department of Defense and the military departments should
not be permitted, nor should they permit themselves, to authorize the
administrative discharge of service people with less than an honorable
discharge (not general, not undesirable) for conduct bereft of fault.
That a man is sick or is not endowed with adequate mental or physical
strengths (inaptitude, character and behavior disorders, apathy, alco-
holism, homosexuality, perversion, abuse, enuresis, unsanitary habits)
should be insufficient to brand him as less deserving of an honorable
discharge than his healthier or stronger brothers. A more nearly
candid recognition that weaknesses are widely distributed throughout
the population, and that even the strong have their limits of tolerance,




Nor should the military departments separate their people with
anything but an honorable discharge under definitions as vague, empty,
cumbersome, and unwieldy as those used by the Department of De-
fense. Inability to learn what? Mathematics or ditch digging? Want
of readiness of what skill? Small or large motor muscle control? Un-
handiness? Left or right unhandiness? Character or behavior dis-
orders? If it takes, as the regulations say, a medical authority to make
this diagnosis, why brand the man?
What of apathy? A mathematician apathetic to ditch digging, or
a laborer to mathematics? And what is a "defective attitude"? A dim
view of the war? Over-enthusiasm for killing? Inability to expend ef-
fort constructively? A messy desk, reluctance to serve the admiral's mess,
103. 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.6(i)(1)-(7) (1970). With the exception of an expanded
definition of drug abuse, the services repeat without further explanation definitions
of the Department of Defense. Army Reg. 635-212, para. 6(a) (July 15, 1966);
Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.12(b) (1970); Air Force Manual 39-12, para. 2-15 (Sept. 1,
1966).
104. Ninety-three percent of the noncommissioned officers who had been in
combat'for less than 4 months "had no use" for a soldier who went AWOL from the
front after having been on the front line for a long period of time. However, only 26
percent of the noncoms who had been in combat for 9 months took a similar view.
Smith, Combat Motivations Among Ground Troops, in 2 STUDIES IN SocIAL Psy-
CHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR 11, 105, 116 (1949). If grizzled noncommissioned officers
recognize weakness, why should not the rest of us?
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disregard of useless tasks? Frequent involvement of a discreditable na-
ture with civil or military authorities? Too many speeding tickets, too
many appeals? To whose discredit and to what extent?
It is no answer to argue that American courts are required to deal
with terms of equal breadth. Courts define, have or gain experience,
rely on reported decisions of their predecessors, and, when necessary,
by characterizing as overly broad, return too broad statutes to the legis-
lature. Administrative discharge boards have none of the independence
of courts, receive little or no assistance in defining vague terms, have no
library to tell them, for instance, what is and what is not "discreditable,"
sit on an ad hoc or at best temporary basis, and view their tasks as
peripheral to their principal duties.
V. The Overlap with the Criminal Law
Sexual perversion, lewd and lascivious acts, some homosexual acts,
sodomy, indecent exposure, indecent acts with or assault upon a child,
seem matters falling well within the ambit of the punitive articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Acts which fall within the code but
which are not tried by a court-martial should not be permitted to fur-
nish the foundation for a separation with either a general or undesira-
ble discharge.
As a matter of fact, the Department of Defense expressly au-
thorizes a general discharge when the grounds are based wholly or in
part upon acts or omissions for which the service member has been
previously tried by court-martial and acquitted. 10 5 Trial by court-mar-
tial may preclude an undesirable discharge after an acquittal, "except
when such acquittal or equivalent disposition is based on a legal tech-
nicality not going to the merits."' °6  Legal technicalities turn out to
mean no "trial because of dismissal," 10 7 trial "terminated due to lack of
availability of witnesses or for some other reason,"' 08 insufficient "evi-
dence of the corpus delicit [sic] to corroborate the confession,"' 1 and
trial "barred by the statute of limitations."'" 0 Further, the infrequent
but typical case involving child molestation is described thus:
The court has been assembled. You have started to go to
105. 32 C.F.R. § 41.4(a)(7) (1970).
106. Id.
107. 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 1, at 399 (testimony of General Berg, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense).
108. Id.
109. Id. (testimony of General Hodson, then the Assistant Judge Advocate of
the Army for Military Justice, now the Judge Advocate General).
110. Id. at 400.
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trial in the case, and your minor witness, the child of tender years,
9, 10, 11 years old-you have been assured by the mother that the
witness will be there, will be ready to testify-and you start the
case, and jeopardy attaches, and all of a sudden the witness
breaks down on the witness stand, gets scared, and the mother pulls
her off or pulls him off."1
Convenience of the Government, that is lack of evidence, lack of wit-
nesses, stale trials, and compassion for witnesses (however admirable)
should be no excuse for the award of a general or undesirable discharge.
This is particularly true here in the twilight zone between "discipline"
as imposed by court-martial and as imposed by an administrative board.
A. Hearing
The Defense Department is under the impression that whether or
not a respondent is entitled to a hearing depends in part on how long he
has been in the service." 2 If the respondent is slated for an undesira-
ble discharge, there is no question; he may have a hearing before an ad-
ministrative discharge board."13 But in the case of a general discharge
the serviceman must have at least 8 years continuous active service to be
entitled to a hearing. 1 4 If he has less than that, he is merely notified in
writing of the proposed discharge action and allowed to make a state-
ment in his own behalf. 115 Although the Army"116 and the Air Force
11r
do allow hearings to all respondents, the Navy does not."18 It follows
the Defense Department's directive requiring 8 years of active and con-
tinuous service.
B. Counsel
Respondents eligible for a hearing on either an undesirable dis-
charge or a general discharge, says the Department of Defense, have
the right to be represented by "counsel." 19 But "counsel," except in the
Air Force, only means a military lawyer qualified under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice "unless appropriate authority certifies in the
111. Id. at 401. Professor Wigmore warns of the child's love of fantasy, but he
abandons any hope of its measurement. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 509, at 601 (3d
ed. 1940).
112. See, 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.7(c)(1)-(2) (1970).
113. Id. § 41.7(d)(1)(i).
114. Id. § 41.7(c)(2).
115. Id. § 41.7(C)(1).
116. Army Reg. 635-212, para. 17(c)(2) (July 15, 1966).
117. Air Force Manual 39-12, para. 1-25(c) (4) (a) (Sept. 1, 1966) & para. 3-6
(c) (change no. 1) (Nov. 30, 1967).
118. Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.10(f) (1970).
119. 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.7(c)(2), 41.7(d)(1)(ii) (1970).
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may request the appearance before the board of any witness whose
testimony he believes to be pertinent to his case. He will specify
in his request the type of information the witness can provide. The
board will invite the witness to attend if it considers that the witness
is reasonably available and that his testimony can add ma-
terially to the case. If a witness on active duty declines the invita-
tion, the board may refer the matter to the convening authority for
a decision or orders. However, witnesses not on active duty must
appear voluntarily and at no expense to the Government. 121
D. Challenges
The respondent may challenge for cause, but not preemptorily.
122
VI. The Army Exemplar
Tying all of this together in the back of the promulgating Army
Regulations is an exemplar of the record of the proceedings of a board
called to consider whether or not to discharge one Private John Doe for
unfitness with an undesirable discharge. Apparently this specimen is a
model of what the Department of the Army expects in a discharge pro-
ceeding; surely it was not published as an example of what not to do.
Doe, so the record recites, is 20 years old.123  During the first 4
months of his enlistment when he was in basic training, Doe's conduct
and efficiency were satisfactory.12 1 Only after he arrived in the 4th
Battle Group did his ratings fall to unsatisfactory. 12  He was shifted
among three different companies, presumably in an attempt to rehabili-
tate him, but all three were parts of the 4th Battle Group.'
26
120. Defense Dep't, 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(k) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212, para.
16 (July 15, 1966); Navy 32 C.F.R. § 730.1(a)(10) (1970). The Air Force does
not permit its commanders to escape furnishing qualified counsel. Air Force Manual
39-12, paras. 1-25(b), 1-4(e) (Sept. 1, 1966).
121. Defense Dep't, 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(c)(3) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212,
para. 17(c)(2)(b) (July 15, 1966); Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(e)(2) (1970); Air
Force Manual 39-12, para. 3-6(c)(2) (change no. 1) (Nov. 30, 1967).
122. Defense Dep't, 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(c)(2) (1970); Army Reg. 635-212, para.
17(c)(2)(b) (July 15, 1966); Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(e)(2) (1970); Air Force
Manual 39-12, para. 3-6(c)(2) (change 1) (Nov. 30, 1967).
123. Army Reg. 635-212, app., at 17 (July 15, 1966).
124. Id. at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 18.
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Doe was convicted by court-martial three times; once for AWOL
for 7 days, once for negligently damaging United States' property, and
once for 6 days AWOL and disrespect to a noncommissioned officer
while in the execution of his office.' 27 (This last conviction occurred
only 6 days prior to the convening of Doe's administrative discharge
board. Apparently at that time his conduct in the opinion of the court-
martial was either thought not to, or did not, support a bad conduct dis-
charge.) Doe's battle group commander recommended an unfitness
(undesirable) discharge "because of habits and traits of character mani-
fested by repeated commission of petty offenses and habits of shirk-
ing."12
8
At Doe's hearing his first company commander spoke of the tasks
at which Doe failed, as did the other witnesses, and testified that Doe
developed a "bad attitude toward his job and the Army" and "became
more sullen and uncooperative.' 29  Sergeant Brown, a subordinate of
the company commander, who supervised Doe for 12 days, told the
board that Doe's "attitude and performance were bad."'8 0  Titus
Moody, Doe's second commanding officer who "tried Doe out in just
about all positions in the company [in 3 months?]," opined "that he
will never make a good soldier and should be gotten rid of as soon as
possible." ' ' Doe's burning the potatoes caused Moody's sergeant cook
to conclude that, "His attitude is bad."' 3 2 Doe's last company com-
mander, who gave evidence showing some attempt to get at Doe's prob-
lem, found him "a continual headache" and despaired of anyone con-
trolling him.
1' 3
Doe himself is said to have testified that he quit school after the 9th
grade, was picked up by the police, enlisted, at first liked the Army, was
disappointed when he didn't make private first class, concluded that it
was no use, felt himself misunderstood by his, officers and sergeants,
and objected to always being pushed around.
34
Attached to the record is the certificate of a psychiatrist whose
judgment was that Doe had "an inadequate personality." The doctor,
noting that Doe could not be discharged through medical channels, and
that he was sane, remarked that Doe's "social inadaptability prior to and
127. Id. at 20.
128. id. at 18.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id. at 26-27.
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id. at 28-29.
134. Id. at 29-30.
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during service," his poor judgment, lack of commitment and motiva-
tion; judged that he would not adjust to further service, that additional
efforts to rehabilitate Doe would be to no avail; and recommended that
Doe be found unfit or unsuitable.13 5
The argument of Doe's two counsel and the Government's one is
not reported at all, even in summary. 3 6  On this slim summary of
proceedings, which in the original covers only seven double-spaced
pages, and the substance of which is here only modestly abbreviated,
the board recommended that Doe be separated for unfitness with an
"other than honorable" discharge.137
The Government's prototypical record is silent on many matters
which any board might well wish to evaluate before handing down a
lifetime lasting undesirable discharge. Indeed, one wonders what the
Government thinks the functions of the two counsel (one lawyer and
one infantry officer) assigned to respondent'38 should be in an adminis-
trative discharge case, and in addition, how well the lawyer would fare
in a hearing to determine the adequacy of his representation of Private
Doe.
Private Doe was a junior high school dropout, with a criminal
record, without skills, training, or a trade, and without demonstrated
ability to learn. Was not the probability of his failure predictable? If
so, what portion of the responsibility for his failure should be placed on
the institution which accepted him in the first place? How fair is a
Government or a military organization which places such a youngster
in a situation where he can reasonably be expected to fail, and then
characterizes his service as less than honorable when he does the ex-
pectable?
The record says nothing about the companies to which Private Doe
was assigned, and nothing about the 4th Battle Group of which those
companies were part. What was the status of their training? Were
they confused beginners, or confident, accomplished organizations?
The patience, time, and ability to deal compassionately with the poorly
performing soldier increases, arguably, with the experience, competence,
and morale of the organization of which he is a member. What were
the court-martial and administrative discharge rates of the commands
of which Doe was a member? Do those statistics show a compara-
tively high reliance on punishment and discharge as methods of treating
135. Id. at 41.
136. Id. at 30.
137. Id. at 31.
138. Id. at 22.
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problem soldiers?
The Army record omits any consideration of the qualifications of
the superiors of Doe who testified (as experts!) against him. How well
educated were they? How well trained in leadership? How long had
they held positions of command? What Army schools had they at-
tended? Were they technically competent?
The Army finds it unnecessary for the board even to attempt to
discover why, when Doe was such a nuisance in the 4th Battle Group,
he nonetheless performed adequately in basic training. Before Doe was
branded for life as undesirable should not his basic training sergeants
and officers have been consulted?
The efforts the Army has its mythical 4th Battle Group make to
find Doe a spot where he could perform in minimally acceptable fashion
seem not likely to produce that result. His reassignments were all within
the same small command where his reputation could easily follow him.
His first month in a squad went well enough. Then Doe went
AWOL, and thereafter nothing he did turned out right. He left part of
his ammunition behind because it was too heavy for him to carry (was
it?). He was late for formation, appeared in a dirty uniform, burned
the potatoes, was less than energetic about cleaning some rifles, and
damaged the contents of a crate he unpacked with too much vigor.
Doe's first AWOL seems to mark, in time at least, the alteration of his
conduct for the worse. Lay efforts by his superiors to identify Doe's
problem were futile. He "refused to say what was bothering him."'139
The first AWOL, or some time shortly thereafter before Doe became
a respondent in discharge proceedings, was the moment when psychi-
atric evaluation might have proved helpful both to Doe and to his or-
ganization. If the Army takes a man showing "marked social inadapt-
ability prior to . . . service,' 40 it should supply adequate professional
help before it separates that man with a stigmatized discharge.
The psychiatrist who advised the board by certificate that Doe
"will not adjust to further military service" and that "further rehabilita-
tive efforts probably will be non-productive" did not appear before
the board. How experienced, educated, and well adjusted to Army
practice was he? How long was his interview with Doe? What is an
"inadequate personality" anyway? The regulations do not say.
The record which the Army has prepared to guide administrative
discharge boards, commanders, and those entrusted with the review of
139. Id. at 25.
140. Id. at 41.
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the actions of those boards, encourages Spartan brevity, expert testimony
by those who are not expert, the admission of extrajudicial statements
by those who are said to be experts, and discourages the admission of
highly relevant evidence. It presents a picture of justice reminiscent
of the caricatures of traffic courts.
VII. Post Board Review and the Convening Authority
The Department of Defense permits the officer authorized to take
final action in discharge cases to approve the board's recommenda-
tion, 1 to change the kind of discharge recommended by the board to a
more creditable one,1 2 to suspend the execution of the discharge," 3
or to retain the respondent in the service despite the board's recom-
mendation. 44 He may set aside the findings of the board and refer
the matter to a new board "if he finds legal prejudice to the substantial
rights of the respondent."' 45  But the discharge authority may also dis-
approve the board's advice to retain the respondent in the service and
direct his separation with either an honorable or general discharge.' 6
The Navy regulations track those of the Department of Defense, 4 7 but at
least the Air Force and the Army appear not to give their officers the
power to discharge when the board recommends retention. 14
The Army regulations do not quite match those of the Department
of Defense or of the Navy. The Army's final authority may not direct dis-
charge if a board recommends retention. 149 But a service person in the
Army, whose first board believed he should be retained in the service,
may be ordered before a new board if "substantial new evidence, fraud,
or collusion is discovered, which was not known at the time of the
original proceeding, despite the exercise of due diligence, and which
will probably produce a result significantly less favorable for the mem-
ber at a new hearing."' 50 Similarly, a new board, convened because the
first materially prejudiced a substantial right of the respondent, may
obtain or be furnished additional evidence.'
5'
141. 32 C.F.R. § 41.8(d)(1) (1970).
142. Id. § 41.8(d)(2).
143. Id. § 41.8(d)(4).
144. Id. § 41.8(d)(5).
145. Id. § 41.8(d)(7).
146. Id. § 41.8(d)(6).
147. Navy, 32 C.F.R. § 730.15(a) (1970).
148. Air Force Manual 39-12, tables 2-A-i, 2-B-1 (change no. 1) (Nov. 30,
1967).
149. Army Reg. 635-200, para. 1-13(c) (July 15, 1966).
150. Id. para. 1-13(b)(1).
151. Id. para. 1-13(d)(4).
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In any adversarial proceeding between the United States and one
of its citizens the resources available to the Government, whether or not
they are employed, greatly outweigh those available to the individual.
The imbalance is even more striking when, as in administrative discharge
proceedings, the barriers between the Government's power and the re-
spondent are lower than they are in criminal proceedings. Why under
any circumstances would the officer having final authority need the
power to give a general discharge to an enlisted person when a board
has recommended his retention in the service? And in the Army
where such a procedure is not permitted there is still lacking a civilized
regard for the need for an early termination of litigation. The particu-
lar vulnerability of enlisted people, as well as the disparity of power be-
tween the respondent and the Army, should make the Army content with
one board, even if at that board it failed to make its case.
VIH. Solutions
Those who would change the existing system of enlisted administra-
tive discharges 5 ' may travel one of three routes. (1) They may seek to
improve the system by surrounding the administrative discharge re-
spondent with a closer approximation of the rights which protect the
accused in a court-martial. (2) They may attempt to forbid the serv-
ices the opportunity to award administrative discharges at all, perhaps
152. The attention that Congress has given to administrative discharges has re-
sulted in two bills. H.R. 943, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), concerns itself only with
undesirable discharges. S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), introduced by Senator
Ervin, is a much more comprehensive effort to deal with the problem of administra-
tive discharges. Many of its improvements are most welcome. Its important provisions
may be summarized as follows: section 947 requires that the respondent be furnished
counsel; section 945 makes anyone who has information or knowledge about the re-
spondent which might affect his judgment ineligible for membership on a board;
section 951 restricts the appointing authority's command influence; section 953 requires
notification of the parents of an underage or incompetent respondent; and the
senior commander's right to overrule a board and order a discharge is eliminated.
Unfortunately, some of the inequities of the present system are retained and some are
even expanded by this bill. Under section 963(a)(4), the commander may order a new
board if he determines "that the interests of justice would be served by such action."
Under section 963(b), a new board may be appointed to consider the case of a re-
spondent whose first board recommended his retention "if the evidence before the
second, or subsequent, board is [not] substantially the same as the evidence
before the previous board." Separation for unsuitability with a general discharge may
be awarded for "mental, physical, or psychological disabilities" under section 964(b).
Unfitness still encompasses shirking, sexual perversion, failure to pay debts, drug addic-
tion, and frequent discreditable involvement with civil or military authorities under
sections 964(e)(1)-(5). For a more detailed analysis of the bills, see Lynch, The
Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed, 22 MANE L. Rav. 141, 158 (1970).
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in the belief that, because enlistments are of short duration, all the serv-
ices need do is wait a bit and their problem will disappear into the civil-
ian community. (3) Finally there are those people such as myself who,
distressed by the unfairness of administrative discharges, recommend
leaving the military departments with a system which is significantly less
cumbersome than courts-martial but which, in exchange, eliminates
the stigma of the general and undesirable discharge.
Integration with the Judicial Process
Senator Ervin has elected the first path which would make the
system of administrative discharges parallel in most important respects
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 153 In a sense the Senator is pro-
posing a greater integration of the judicial and administrative machinery.
For instance, Senator Ervin's bill provides that the Court of Military Ap-
peals shall prescribe by rule for the review of administrative discharge
action with the court itself specifying the grounds upon which such re-
view may be obtained by the respondent or by his armed force.154  The
Senator's road is obstructed by forceful argument and propositions of
such real or apparent strength that they may impair the success of his
effort.
As was noted earlier, the authority of the services to discharge ad-
ministratively finds its justification in the need of the services to be rid
of some of their members by methods more summary than those sup-
plied by criminal law. The services propose, not entirely unpersua-
sively, that ready ways should be available to them to get free of the
bedwetter, the homosexual, the unfit, the misfit, and the incompetent.
They urge that the more discharges come to resemble courts-martial the
more uncertain, time consuming, and expensive they become. For the
end they seek, the early separation of Private Doe, discharges that are
as difficult to accomplish as courts-martial are of little or no use.
Private Doe and others like him (30,000 to 40,000 a year, say the
military departments) 155 are troublesome characters. They occupy
much more than their fair share of administrative, medical, psychiatric,
rehabilitative, and legal resources. They keep coming, despite the ef-
forts of the services and the Selective Service System to screen them out in
advance of enlistment, and the annual rate of administrative discharge
tends to show that the services' efforts to counsel and rehabilitate are
153. See note 152 supra.
154. S. 1266, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 966(b) (1969).
155. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 3, at 1001, 1005, 1035, 1045.
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frequently frustrated. Given its necessary concentration on other mat-
ters, the military or the military judiciary may never prove to be the
proper agency to restore the inadequate.
Finally, the services argue, supervision of administrative discharges
will place an intolerable burden on the Court of Military Appeals. 56
And this coupled with the other arguments will, I believe, cripple recom-
mendations which would eliminate administrative discharges and those
which would protect the respondent in much the same way the accused
is now protected.
A More Realisitc Proposal
The principal evil in administrative discharges is the opportunity
now available to, and widely used by, the military departments to grant
general and undesirable discharges. I would remove that opportunity.
The Committee on Military Justice of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, when I was one of its members, posed "the question
of whether [the purpose of certain legislation] in the field of adminis-
trative discharge proceedings can be achieved only by the complete
removal of the label or characterization of a discharge.' 5 7 At the time,
Senator Ervin agreed that the abolition of administratively awarded,
derogatory characterizations of service merited study and considera-
tion.
158
The time for further study is passed. The military departments
should be denied the authority to award by administrative action any
but an honorable discharge. The indelible brand of an undesirable or
general discharge, awarded by a process, which at best is uncertain and
framed by regulations that exhibit little compassion and no understand-
ing of the weak and the deprived, inflames the most sympathetic critics
of the military.
156. Id. pt. 1, at 23.
157. Id. at 121. The context of its statements shows that the committee did
not intend to suggest the removal of the label "Honorable" from administrative
discharges.
158. Id. at 122.
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